

Faculty of Humanities | Philosophy Department

The Departmental Colloquium



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Direct Perception: The Futility of Representations, The Knowledge Argument

Abstract: A common view in philosophy is that we see, hear and so on by means of representations, formed in the mind or brain by the things we perceive and of which we are immediately aware. These representations have qualities accessible to perceivers in their immediate, private experience. Descartes, Locke and many others since have held this or a similar position. By contrast, I shall defend a direct perception view: we see things without being aware of any representation. Over time quite a few arguments have been raised against a direct perception view, two of which I shall address in this talk. First, many have held that representations offer an explanation to the phenomena of hallucination and illusion; I shall show that this attempt involves a regress. Secondly, Jackson's Knowledge Argument is taken to show that perception involves a non-physical fact, a quality of our experience; I shall show that this argument involves an implausible assumption, the justification of which would make it redundant. Time permitting, I shall elaborate on other aspects of the direct perception view.

The lecture will be in English

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