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צרו קשר

ראש החוג:
פרופ' דני אטאס  daniel.attas@mail.huji.ac.il
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ברכות חמות לד"ר רונה דינור על סיום עבודת הדוקטורט

מרץ 15, 2020


הרשות לתלמידי מחקר אישרה את עבודת הדוקטורט של חברתנו, ד"ר רונה דינור

אשר כתבה תחת הנחייתו של דוד אנוך ומשה הלברטל את עבודת הדוקטורט, שכותרתה Discrimination as a Violation of Relational Equality

ברכות חמות לרונה ולבני משפחתה, וגם לדוד ומשה. בשעה טובה ובהצלחה בהמשך הדרך!

 

תקציר העבודה 

 

"Discrimination as a Violation of Relational Equality" 

The dissertation examines the moral objection to individual, identifiable actions of discrimination that are directed at individuals due to their membership in a socially salient group—such as their race or gender. It integrates two emerging strands of the literature to shed new light on existing analysis: first, discussions in political philosophy regarding the nature of equality; and second, discussions in the philosophy of mind which examine the nature of cognitive mechanisms related to intergroup relations.

The first chapter argues that contrary to a common assumption, there are two distinct types of discrimination—one violating distributive equality, that is, a value concerned with the egalitarian distribution of goods; and another violating relational equality, that is, a value concerned with egalitarian relations between people. The second chapter then focuses on discriminatory actions that are perpetrated in situations where the victimized group is viewed as a threat to social order. Accounting for the moral objection that such actions raise has proven challenging, as the beliefs that underlie them are often based on statistical data about the group. Based on studies in cognitive psychology, it is argued that the objection to such actions stems not from such beliefs, but from objectionable perceptual states that are typically employed in such situations. Lastly, the third chapter focuses on the prominent distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination, whose conceptual and moral underpinnings have remained so far unclear. It argues that intentional discrimination is characterized by the agent viewing the content of a discriminatory mental state as her reason for action, which amounts to endorsing its objectionable content.